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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
BENJAMIN F. ALWARD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
R. E. GREEN, doing business as
NATIONAL SCHOOL ASSEMBLIES,
Defendant-Respondent.
RESP~ONDENT '.S

BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with the statement of facts set
forth in the appellant's brief, but desires to give in more
detail the evidence relating to the purported agency of
R. W. Dill, upon whom the attempted service of summons was made.
Dill was a resident of San Diego, California. On
January 16, 1950, he and his brother were in Salt Lake
City for the purpose of filling engagements booked for
them by the defendant {R. 30). The defendant had acted
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as their agent in securing said bookings. Dill was engaged in filling such bookings for a period of only five
weeks. He had just commenced filling said engagements
when the summons was served on the 16th day of January, 1950 and when the matter was heard on the 11th
day of February, 1950, he had completed his engagements and was intending to return to San Diego. While
in Salt Lake he and his brother had fulfilled three bookings made for them by Mr. Clarence Smith at Salt Lake
Ctiy, who, like the defendant, was also a booking agent.
These performances were given two at the Hotel Utah
and one at the Newhouse Hotel. The defendant received
nothing from those performances (R. 31). The defendant
had no control over the operations of Dill other than
seeing that the bookings made for Dill by the defendant
were filled (R. 32). Dill retained the first $200.00 per
week collected for performances given pursuant to bookings by the defendant and all over $200.00 per week
collected by Dill was paid to the defendant for defendant's services (R. 32). With very few exceptions all
checks were made directly to Dill from the schools where
the performances were given. Occasionally a school
would make a check payable to National School Assemblies (R. 33). Dill did not carry a power of attorney
to cash any check made out to the National School Assemblies and would send any such check to the defendant
as a credit on any balance over $200.00 collected for any
week (R. 34). Collections were made by Dill for himself
not for the defendant (R. 36). Before leaving California
to fill engagements made for him by the defendant, Dill
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received a min1eographed set of suggestions from the
defendant. Dill received no directions from the defendant relative to the giving of a show other or different
from those received from any other booking agent of the
said Dill (R. 39). That the Defendant determined where
Dill would perform and sent to Dill a schedule ahead
of time. That Green had set a prearranged price for
Dill's program and scheduled a number of programs
to be given and suggested the length of time of the p·rogram (R. 40).
There is one other fact that the defendant desires
to call attention to. As stated in the app·ellant 's brief
•at page 7:
''While in Salt Lake City the plaintiff corresponded with defendant. As a result of this
correspondence and because of his not reaching
South Dakota, the plaintiff received a letter from
the defendant whereby the latter cancelled the
remainder of the plaintiff's tour of the midwest
for the year and terminated the plaintiff's contract (Exhibit A)."
Exhibit "A" was signed and mailed in Los Angeles, Californi•a, and was in answer to a letter of
inquiry from the plaintiff concerning plaintiff's future
activities. Exhibit "A" was received in Salt Lake
City by the plaintiff.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
1. The Court erred in finding that the defendant
had an agent in Utah if by that the Court me'a.nt that
R. W. Dill was an agent of the defendant upon whom
service of summons could be made under the provisions of Rule 17 (e) and Rule 4 (e) (10), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
2. The Court did not err in holding that the
defendant by and through R. W. Dill, the purported
agent upon whom service of summons was made, was
not doing business at the school where the .attempted
service of summons was made within the contemplation of Rules 17 (e) and 4 (e) (10) of the Rules of
Civil Procedure.
3. The Court did not err in holding that the
school -at which the defendant's purported 'agent
was served with summons was not a place of business
of the defendant within the contemplation of Rules
17 (e) and 4 (e) (10) .
4. The Court did not err in holding that the
cause of action did not arise out of the conduct of
business in the State of Utah within the contemplation
of Rule 17 (e) and Rule 4 {e) (10).
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ARGU~1ENT

POINT ONE
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD AN AGENT IN UTAH IF BY THAT THE
COURT MEANT THAT R. W. DILL WAS AN AGENT OF
THE DEFENDANT UPON WHOM SERVICE OF SUMMONS
COULD BE MADE UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF RULE
17 (e) AND RULE 4 (e) (10), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.

Rule 17 (e) provides :
"When a nonresident person is associated in
and conducts business "\\ ithin the State of Utah
in one or more places in his own name or a
common trade name ·a.nd said business is conducted under the supervision of a manager,
superintendent or agent, said person may be
sued in his own name in any action arising out
of the conduct of said business. ''
7

Rule 4 (e) (10) provides:
''Personal Service in this State. Personal
service within the state shall be as follows:
* * * (10) upon a natural person, nonresident of the State of Utah, doing business in
this state at one or more places of business as
set forth in Rule 17 (e) by delivering a copy
thereof to the defendant personally, or to one
of his managers, superintendents, or ·agents."
Any act providing for substituted service upon
an individual in order to be constitutional must provide
certain safeguards for the defendant. The following
discussion from the case of Davidson v. Doherty &
Company, 214 Iowa 739, 241 N.W. 700, 91 A.L.R. 1308,
points out these requirements:
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"It is frequently stated as a general proposition that the processes of a state court do not
extend beyond its borders and that a state cannot in general obtain jurisdiction of a nonresident
in an action in personam unless the defendant is
served within the state or appears to the action.
To this broad and general statement of the rule
there are exceptions, as for example, where
there is a waiver or a contract to the contrary * * *
''Another exception, or more properly speaking, a rule 'a.s to what constitutes due notice is
illustrated by the cases upholding statutes where
a nonresident of a state, by carrying on certain
lines of business or doing certain acts, as dealing in securities or driving an automobile on
the public highways, is required, or presumed,
to designate !an officer or agent in said state
upon whom service of notice may be made in
actions in said state growing out of the business
or acts done * * *
"Similarly, there are statutes such as the
one under consideration, where a nonresident
voluntarily comes within the state and establishes
an office or agency and transacts business, and the
service of summons is made by substituted service
upon the agent of the defndant, and the action is
one growing out of that office or 'agency.
''Does such a statute meet the requirements
of 'notice and opportunity to defend'~ If notice
on 'a public officer, such as a registrar or secretary of state is sufficient in an action in personam .against a nonresident no good reason is
apparent why a notice by like substituted service
on a party's own agent in charge of his business
in actions growing out of such business should
not be equally valid.''
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The question then becomes one of whether or not
substituted service is on a party's agent in ch,arge of
his business. If the one served is not an agent in
charge of the defendant's business, the requirements
of notice and opportunity to defend are not met.
The court said in Davidson v. Doherty d!; Company,
supra:
"As is said in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 355,
47 S. Ct. 632-633, 71 L.ed. 1091: 'The mere
transaction of business in a state by nonresident
persons does not imply consent to be bound by
the process of its courts.'
"Moreover, the agency of one upon whom
service is made must be such as to render it
fairly reasonable and just to imply authority
on the part o~ the agent to receive service * * *
"The agent must he one who may fairly be
presumed to have the duty of communicating
to his principal the fact of service.''
In the case of Wein v. Crockett, 195 Pac. (2d) 222
at page 228, Justice Latimer, speaking for the majority,
stated:
"The act requires service of p·rocess to be
made on an agent of the nonresident and that
tl!e agent at the time of service must be conducting the business for ·and on behalf of the
nonresident and the action must arise out of
the business transacted in the state. If the
agent has the capacity to perform as manager,
superintendent or agent in supervising the affairs
of a nonresident, we can infer he will have the
capacity to understand the necessity of notifying the principal in time to permit proper protection of the principal's rights."
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The appellant cites at length in his brief from the
case of Melvin Pine &; Compwny v. MoConnell, 273
App. Div. 218, 76 NYS (2d) 279, 10 A.L.R. (2d) 194.
In that case the Court said:
''The statutory requirements for doing business in this state is not satisfied unless a substantial part of the business is conducted within
the state and the person in charge thereof invested with general powers of judgment and
discretion * * *
''Nevertheless on the record in this case there
would seem to be no gainsaying the fact that
they (the parties served) were agents invested
with general powers involving judgment and
discretion in connection with the defendant's
business and the advancement of defendant's
interests.''
Dill was not such an agent as the statute contenlplates. He was an independent contractor. He was the
principal and Green was his agent. Dill was under no
duty to transact any business for the defendant and
he was under no duty to communicate the fact of
service to the defendant.
Rule 4 (e) (10) provides that service may be
made in this state at one or more places of business.
The statute contemplates a permanent office or place
of business at which an agent or superintendent shall
be in charge whose duty it is to transact the business
of the nonresident defendant, invested with general
powers of judgment and discretion in directing the
affairs of the nonresident defendant. A performer who
is fulfilling an itinerary or schedule previously booked
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by the defendant and who had no duty to perform

other than fulfilling those bookings and paying any
surplus that he received over $200.00 a week, was not
such a manager, superintendent or agent within the
contempl~ation of the statute and the school building
was not a place of business within the contemplation
of the statute.
The defendant calls the attention of the Court to
the fact that the evidence as to the authority of
Alward, the plaintiff, as set forth at pages 24 to 28
of the plaintiff's brief, does not ·apply to Dill. Dill
definitely stated that he did not have a power of
attorney to cash or endorse any ch-ecks such as Alward
had. Nor is there any evidence that the other matters
therein set forth had any application to the rel·ationship·
existing between Dill and the defendant. Alward
intended to act as a performer for a year or more.
Green made bookings for Dill for a period of five
weeks only.
There are two methods of serving nonresident
defendants. One is that set forth in the second paragraph of the first quotation from Davidson v. D·ohe.rty,
supra. Such is where a nonresident is carrying on a
certain line of business such as selling securities or
driving an automobile in the state and the statute
requires service upon an officer in the state such as
the Secretary of State for the nonresident. These cases
all provide that a copy of the complaint and summons
must be immediately sent, registered mail, with receipt
requested, to the defendant. In that class of cases is
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the case of International Shoe Company v. 'Washington,
discussed in the plaintiff's brief at pages 32 and 33.
The other method of serving nonresident defendants
is that set forth in the third ·paragraph of the citation'
from Davidson v. Doherty, where a nonresident voluntarily comes into the state and establishes an office
or agency and. the service of summons is made by
substituted service upon a manager, superintendent or
agent of the defendant, and the action is one growing
out of that office or agency. In this class of cases there
is no requirement that 'a copy of the complaint and
summons be mailed to the defendant, therefore it is·
necessary that the one served be an agent, superintendent or manager, whose· duty it is to transmit the
summons when served upon him, and as said in the
case of Melvin Pine & Company v. McConnell, supra,
the agent must be one vested with general powers involving judgment and discretion in connection with
the defendant's business.
POINT TWO
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT THE
DEFENDANT BY AND THROUGH R. W. DILL, THE PURPORTED AGENT UPON WHOM SERVICE OF SUMMONS
WAS MADE, WAS NOT DOING BUSINESS AT THE
SCHOOL WHERE THE ATTEMPTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS WAS MADE WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF
RULES 17 (e) and 4 (e) (10) OF THE RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.

The cases cited above and the cases cited under
Point Four cover this point.
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POINT THREE
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT THE
SCHOOL AT WHICH THE DEFENDANT'S PURPORTED
AGENT WAS SERVED WITH SUMMONS WAS NOT A
PLACE OF BUSINESS OF THE DEFENDANT WITHIN
THE CONTEMPLATION OF RULE 17 (e) and 4 (e) (10).

The cases cited above and the cases cited under
Point Four cover this point.
POINT FOUR
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT THE
CAUSE OF ACTION DID NOT ARISE OUT OF THE CONDUCT OF BUSINESS IN THE STATE OF UTAH WITHIN
THE CONTEMPLATION OF RULE 17 (e) AND RULE
4 (e) (10).

Counsel for the plaintiff argues at length that
Rule 17 (e) refers only to "action" and not "cause of
action" and that under the statute a cause of action
need not aris-e in Utah so long as the action is filed in
Utah. At page 24 of plaintiff's brief, he states:
"In those places where Justice Latimer indicated that the situs of the cause of action had
anything to do with the case, his statements
were pure dicta and not significant since there
was no reason in the W ein case for making such
a distinction betwen the terms.''
The law is clear that nonresidents cannot be sued
in this state except upon a cause of action which arises
in this state. Justice Latimer's many statements in
the W ein case concerning ''cause of action'' arising
in this state were not dicta. They were merely a correct
statement of the law. Without the limitations restricting the statute to causes of action arising in this state
the act would be unconstitutional.
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The plaintiff in his brief states that the Trial
Court labored under the impression ~hat the cause of
action must arise in Utah and that in that the Court
was in error. The defendant submits that the Court
was not in error on that point.
After reviewing the authorities, Justice Latimer
in the case of Wein v. Crockett, supra, stated the law
to be as follows :
''Having roughly traced the trend of authorities a way from the strict and narrow holdings
of the early cases to more liberal principles of
permitting a nonresident to be sued in a jurisdiction where he has performed certain acts or
transacted certain business, providing, the cause
of action arose out of the acts or the business
. transacted, we pass to consider whether or not
our act meets the test of constitutionality as set
forth by the later holdings of the Supreme
Court. * * *
''The act requires a service of process to be
made on an agent of the nonresident and that
the agent at the time of the service must be
conducting the business for and on behalf of the
nonresident and the action must arise out of
the business trans'acted in the state. * * *
"We can see no real objections to a statute
which only forbids a nonresident from doing
business in this state until such time as they
have consented to the jurisdiction of our Courts
to rule on causes of action springing into existence within this state and arising out of the
business carried on in this state. We are not
convinced that such 'an act, does, in fact, deny
a nonresident equal protection of -the law or
deprive them of property without due process
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of law. If the cause of action ar1ses 1n this
state, out of business being t~ansacted in this
state, the possibilities are that the witnesses
\vill be readily available here * * * To require
a nonresident to defend where he commits an
alleg·ed \vrong is not an unreasonable imposition.''
The follo\ving citations from 'Wein v. Crockett point
out the reason for limiting the jurisdiction of the
Court to causes of action arising in this state. The
court said at page 230:
''We are convinced under the pTesent day
extensions of business into the various states and
the rapidity of commuting interstate that the
narrow principles of the early cases must be
reexamined in the light of modern conditions,
and that this state to properly protect its citizens
must have a right to subject nonresidents who
maintain offices and transact business herein,
to be subject to the jurisdiction of our courts
if an agent upon whom process can be served is
still in the employment of the nonresident and
if the cause of action arises out of the business
transacted here.
''This holding is not contrary to the holding
of the Supreme Court in Flexner v. Farson,
supra, and is consistent with the holding in the
Howard L. Doherty & Company v. Goodman
case, supTa. The Pennoyer case is clearly distinguishable from the one herein involved. In
that case the agent upon whom process was
served was not an agent at the time of service
and the statute did not limit the suit to causes
of action arising within the state. * * *
"While it may appear unreasonable to reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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quire a nonresident to defend actions which in
no way arise out of the transaction of business
in a foreign jurisdiction, as was attempted in
other cited cases, it is not unreasonable to require a nonresident to defend his rights when
the basis of the suit is the performance of certain acts within the jurisdiction where suit is
instituted. By voluntarily doing business in this
state a nonresident impliedly consents to being
sued upon causes of action arising out of the
transaction of business in this state and further
impliedly consents that service may be made
upon an agent in charge of the business office
maintained here."
The Court further said at page 226 as follows:
"The Superior Court of Delaware in the case
of Caldwell v. Amour et. al., 1 Pennewill 545,
43 A. 517, held a similar statute unconstitutional
for the reason that it deprives the defendant of
property without due process of law. The· act
under consideration by that Court was broader
in scope than the act under consideration in
this case for the reason that under the Delaware
statute the cause of action need not arise out of
the transaction of business in that state.''
At page 227 the Court further stated:
''The Iowa statute required that the defendant have an office or agency in a county; that
the office be in a county other than that in which
the defendant resides; that the action must grow
out of the business of that office or agency and
the agent upon whom service is made must be
employed by the defendant in the office at the
time of the service. ''
At page 229 the Court stated:
''But there would seem to be no objection to
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a statute which forbids nonresidents to do business within the state 'vithout having consente~d
to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state as
to all causes of action arising \vithin the state
and out of the business carried on within the
state * * * The words of Mr. Justice Swayne
speaking of the unfairness of refusing a group the
right to sue a foreign corporation in the state
where the corporation was carrying on business
and where the cause of action arises are equally
applicable * * * The statute requiring persons
carrying on business within the state to consent
to service of process upon an agent in actions
arising within the state out of the business carried on within the state would therefore seem to
fall within the proper scope of the police power.''
1

The following is a statement on the subject fron1
Restatement of the Law-Conflicts, Section 84, page 130:
"Unless limited by the Constitution, a state
by its laws may absolutely forbid the doings of
designated acts within the state. It may allow
such acts to be done only after the person doing
them has expressly agreed to subject himself to
the jurisdiction of the state as to causes of ~action
arising against him arising out of such acts.
A state by its law may provide that the doing of
such acts shall subject the person doing them to
the jurisdiction of the courts of the state as to
causes of action arising out of such acts. If
such a rule or law is in force in the state at
the time when such acts are done within the
state, the person doing such acts thereby subjects
himself to the jurisdiction of the courts of the
state as to causes of action arising out of such
acts. The application of this principle to judgments rendered by the courts of the states of
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the United States is much limited because of
the limitations on the part of the states to forbid
the doing of acts within the states imposed by
various provisions of the Constitution of the
United States, especially the 14th Amendment
and the clause relating to Interstate Commerce
as shown in Section 85. ''
In the case at bar the cause of action arose in Californra and not in Utah. The original contract, Exhibit
''B'', was signed in Los Angeles after the same had
been signed by the plaintiff in S.alt Lake City, and
thus became a California contract. The purported
breach of the contract took place in California !and thus
the cause of action arose in California. This point
apparently the plaintiff concedes in his brief by the
following statement found at pages 20 and 21:
''It is not necessary that the cause of action
(which might technically arise upon mailing a
letter of termination in Los Angeles or Washington, D. C., and therefore have its technical
situs there) arise in this state but only that the
action arise out of conduct of the defendant's
business in this state. * * * Thus, the defendant would contend that although the action may
arise out of conduct of business done in Utah,
the technical situs of the cause of action is in
California and arose upon placing the letter of
cancell'ation in the mails. However, this argument is beside the point in view of the express
wording of our statute."
The defendant does contend that the cause of
action arose in California. However, the argument IS
not beside the point, but is most material.
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The law on the question as to where a cause of
action arises in such a matter as is now before the
Court, is stated in Restatement of the Law-Contracts,
Section 321, as follows :
'• When Repudiation By Mail or Telegram Beconles a Breach.
Statements of repudiation in a letter mailed
or telegram sent to a promisee or other person
having a right under a contract, which if made
orally, would be a breach of contract, constitute
a breach as of the time when and the place where
the letter or telegram is dispatched.''
The case of Anglaize Box Board ~Company v. Kansas
City Fibre Box Company, 35 Fed. (2d) 822, is directly
in point. In that case the plaintiff, a corporation with
its principal place of business at D'Ryton, Ohio, contracted to sell to the defendant, a corporation with its
principal place of business at Kansas City, Kansas,
3"600 tons of jute under twelve separate contracts for
a shipment once each month during the year. After
receiving ten monthly shipments, the defendant and the
plaintiff engaged in a dispute over the price of the
November shipment and after considerable correspondence, the defendant, on December 11, 1920, wrote a
letter to the plain tiff and placed it in the mails at
Kansas City, Kansas, repudiating the contract for
shipments to be made for November and December.
The plaintiff treated the repudiation as a breach and
sued for damages. The question arose as to the time
and place of breach and accrual of the cause of action
because the Statute of Limitations in Kansas ''Tas
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five years and the Statute of Limitations in Ohio on
such an action was fifteen years. In deciding the case,
the Court s~aid :
''It has been repeatedly held that where such
repudiation is relied upon as a breach, the
cause of action arises where the repudiation
occurred, and it is also the rule that, where the
repudiation is by letter, the breach occurs at the
time and place of the delivery of the letter for
transmission, clearly, therefore, the breach occurred at Kansas City when the letter of December 11 was mailed and as this action was not
instituted until more than five years thereafter,
it was barred under the Kansas Statute of
Limitations. ''
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CONCLUSION
The defendant therefore submits that the Trial
Court "~as right in ruling that the Court did not acquire jurisdiction of the defendant. R. W. Dill was
not an agent in charge of defendant's business within
the contemplation of the statute. The school 'a.t which
the attempted service was made w.as not a place of
business of the defendant within the contemplation of
the statute. The cause of action did not arise in Utah
and the Trial Court was right in holding that the
cause of action did not arise out of the conduct of
business done in this state within the contemplation
of the statute.
For the reasons hereinbefore pointed out, it is
submitted that the ruling of the Trial Court should
be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,

J. GRANT

IVERS~ON,

Attorney for Pt6d11liff AfifJSlhtnl.
Defendant-Respondent.
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